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MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
in the latter, Justice Holmes stated, "The essence of a provision forbid-
ding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evi-
dence so acquired shall not be used before the court, but that it shall not
be used at all. Of course this does not mean that the facts thus obtained
become sacred and inaccessible. If knowledge of them is gained from an
independent source they may be proved like any others, but the knowledge
gained by the government's own wrong cannot be used by it in the way pro-
posed." Judge L. Hand concluded, "I do not see any difference in princi-
ple between obtaining the first indictment by the unlawful extraction of
evidence, necessary to its support, and obtaining a document by an un-
reasonable search."
Another issue raised by the defense and supported by the dissent was
that of entrapment. This defense has been defined as follows: "When the
criminal design originates, not with the accused, but it is conceived in the
mind of the government officers, and the accused is by persuasion, deceit-
ful representation, or inducement lured into the commission of a criminal
act, the government is estopped by sound public policy from prosecution
therefore.""4 The point being that the defendant had to repeat the alleged
perjurious statements made in the grand jury hearings or else admit the
charge against him. Thus the government induced the defendant to perjure
himself by securing an indictment for perjury against him by illegal means,
when they knew he must inevitably repeat the perjury in his defense, but
without the procuration of the indictment there could have been no perjur-
ious statements. The court, however, rejected this rather broad interpretat-
ion of entrapment and added that it was inconceivable, to the court at
least, that the government would deliberately procure a false indictment in
the hope of later obtaining perjurious statements at the trial since such
statements could be more easily procured in a new grand jury proceeding.
Although the entrapment argument does not seem very forceful, in the
light of the cogency of the argument that the doctrine of the Silverthorne
case" is applicable, as well as the repugnance to public policy of the per-
haps illicit or at least questionable actions of the government, the dissent-
ing opinion seems to contain a more accurate appraisal of the law involved.
Barton S. Udell
JURIES - VERDICTS -AFFIDAVITS
NOT PERMITTED TO IMPEACH
The defendant was found guilty of rape. After trial a juror's affidavit re-
vealed that, although convinced of the defendant's innocence, he failed to
object to the verdict because of a mistaken belief that a majority vote of
14. Sorrells v. United Stares, 287 U.S. 435 (1932). See also Butts v. United
Stares, 273 Fed. 35 (8th Cir. 1921).
15. 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
CASENOTES
jurors was sufficient to convict.' New trial granted by circuit court and the
state appealed. Held, reversed; It was error to grant a new trial. Affidavits
of jurors are inadmissible to impeach and overthrow a verdict., State v.
Ramirez, 73 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1954).
According to two earlier cases, Packard v. United States, and State v.
Hascall. affidavits of jurors to the effect they misunderstood the instruc-
tions of the court were admissible to impeach their verdicts. In the Packard
case it was held that no person is more competent than the juror himself, to
prove he misunderstood the charge.' There was .sharp conflict among early
American courts as to the admissibility of juror's affidavits. One tribunal
took the extreme view that where a verdict was determined by drawing lots,'
such fact could not be proved by juror's testimony.' In a case where five
jurors presented affidavits that they misunderstood instructions, such affi-
davits were held inadmissible.' In another decision a juror was not permit-
ted to testify that he was threatened with bodily harm by other jurors for
persistence in voting for acquittal."1 Under the more accepted rule, evidence
that jurors misunderstood the .instructions" of the court cannot be shown to
impeach their verdict." In a recent federal case the court refused to hear
the testimony of two jurors that the jury foreman misled them into believing
that a majority vote was sufficient, and dissenters had to join to make the
verdict unanimous." Jurors are legally disabled from impeaching their ver-
dict, generally, except as provided by statutes.' 4 A court may receive a
1. The juror confused the trial judge's charge that in the event of a verdict ofguilty, a vote of a majority was sufficient for a recommendation of mercy.
2. Accord, Dempsey-Vanderbilt Hotel v. Huisman, 153 Fla. 800, 15 So.2d 903(1943); Hamp v. State, 130 Fla. 801, 178 So. 833 (1937); Int'l Lubricant Corp. v.Grant, 128 Fla. 670, 175 So. 727 (1937); Turner v. State, 99 Fla. 246, 126 So. 158(1930); Linsley v. State, 88 FMa. 135, 101 So. 273 (1924); Kelly v. State, 39 Fla.
122, 22 So. 303 (1897); Coker v. Hayes, 16 Fla. 368 (1878).
3. 1 Greene 325, 48 Am.Dec. 375 (Iowa 1848).
4. 6 N.H. 352 (1833).
5. But c/., Wright v. Ill'. and Miss. Telegraph Co., 20 Iowa 195 (1866) Reversing
Packard v. United States, see note 3, supra
6. Smith v. Eames, 3 Scam 76, 36 Am.Dec. 515 (111. 1841); Hamblin v. State, 81Neb. 148, 115 N.W. 850, 16 Ann.Cas. 569 (1908); Tyler v. Steven, 4 N.H. 116, 17
Am.Dec. 404 (1827); Norris v. State, 3 Humph 333, 39 Am.Dec. 175 (Tenn. 1842).
7. Cluggage v. Swan. 4 Binn. 150. 5 Am.Dec. 400 (Pa. 1811).8. However, FLA. STAT. § 920.04 (1951) provides that a verdict determined by
lots, is grounds for motion for new trial.
9- Tyler v. Steven, see note 6, supra.
10. State v. Aker, 54 Wash 342, 103 Pac. 420, 18 Ann.Cas. 922 (1909).ii. Jordon v. United States, 66 App.D.C. 309, 87 F.2d 64 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Loney
v. United States, 151 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1945); Davenport v. Com., 258 Ky. 628, 148S.W.2d 1054 (1941); State v. Pace, 183 La. 838, 1'65 So. 6 (1936); Smith v. State,59 Oki Cr. 237, 56 P.2d 923 (1936); Franco v. Sit'e, 141 Tex Cr. R. 246, 147S.W.2d
1089 (1941).
12. Harris v. State, 241 Ala. 240, 2 So.2d 431 (1941); Turner v. State, 99 Fla.
246, 126 So. 158 (1930); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 39 (1874); Bartlett-v. Patton, 33
W. Va. 7J, 10 S.E. 21 (1889)..
13. United States V. Nystrom, 116 F.Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1953).
14. Brackin v. State, 31 Ala.App.228, 14 So.2d 383 (1943); State v. Bank, 227Iowa 1208, 290 N.W. 534 (1940); accord, Huddleston v. State, 258 Ala. 579, 64
So.2d 90 (1952); People v. Sutic, 41 Cal.2d 483, 261 P.2d 241 (1954); State v. Dye,
148 Kan.421, 83 P.2d 113 (1938).
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juror's testimony to facts evidencing outside influence, but he cannot testi-
fy that such outside influence affected his verdict."5
In the instant case, the juror remained silent when the verdict of guilty
was read aloud in open court. If he objected to such verdict, that was time
to be heard." The Supreme Court said that matters presented in the juror's
affidavit showed it essentially inhered in the verdict itself," and was inad-
missible. Florida follows the general rule," except as to matters which do
not inhere in the verdict," or as otherwise provided by statute.20
The universal adoption of the rule has been a matter of public policy
which seeks to preserve the stability of the courts. "Such evidence, though
not irrelevant, must be excluded, since experience has shown it is more
likely to prevent than promote the discovery of truth"." Not to refuse jurors
testimony is a dangerous principle to follow. It permits tampering with jur-
ors. By various and improper influences,, affidavits could be obtained from
jurors upon which to ground motions for new trials in almost every case.2 '
It is conceded the rule leaves something to be desired since some persons
may become the victims of chance or mistake. However, it is better than to
introduce a rule which could be productive of infinite mischief, whereby no
verdict could be permitted to stand." in Perry v. Bailey, "Justice Brewer
said:
When a juror is heard to impeach his own verdict because of some
matter resting in his own consciousness, the power is given him to
nullify the expressed conclusions under oath of himself and eleven
others.
Paul M. Low
SEARCH AND SEIZURE-STATUTORY AUTHORITY
TO SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT
Defendant's license was suspended when gambling implements were
found on the premises. The licensee instituted a certiorari proceeding to
quash the order, on grounds that the evidence had been procured as a result
15. State v. McKay, 63 Nev. 118, 165 P.2d 389 (1946).
16. United States v. Nystrornm, 116 F.Supp. 771 (W.D. Pa. 1953); State v. Pollock
57 Ariz.415, 114 P.2d 249 (1941); Lawson v. Com., 278 Ky. 1, 127 S.W.2d 879(1939); State v. Priestley, 97 Utah 158, 91 P.2d 447 (1939).
17. Brackin v. State, 31 Ala. App. 228, 14 So.2d 383 (1943); Linsley v. State, 88
Fla. 135, 101 So. 173 (1924).
18. Ibid.
19. Turner v. State, 130 Fla. 801, 178 So. 833 (1930); Linsley v. State, 88 Fln
135, 101 So. 273 (1924); Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan.539 (1874).
20. FLA. STAT. 1 920.04; see note 8, supra; and FLA. STAT. 5 .920.05, which
provides that misconduct of jurors is grounds for motion for new trial.
21. Blodgett v. Park, 76 N.H. 435,84 Art. 42, Ann.Cas. 19138, 853 (1912).
22. Norris v. State, see note 6, sapra.
23. Tyler v. Steven, see note 6, supra.
24. 12 Kan. 539 (1874).
